YUGOSLAVIA IN WW II - DOMESTIC LIFE AND ECONOMY

 

By 1940 the German Reich possessed both a stranglehold on Yugoslavia's foreign trade and an enhanced share of the ownership of its important mines of non-ferrous metals. The dependency of an underdeveloped economy on the export of its peasant proprietors' agricultural surpluses gave Germany political influence as well as economic control. Prince Paul's government felt obliged not only to meet Germany's ever-increasing demands for foodstuffs and raw materials, but also to make the occasional anti-Semitic gesture.

Meanwhile, the progressive absorption of Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria into the Axis camp (Albania was already there) meant that Yugoslavia was virtually surrounded by hostile states with claims on its territory.

The UK was in no position either to contest Germany's economic domination or to outbid the Axis in making offers to Yugoslavia's neighbours. Nor could London make good the country's deficiencies in armaments and aircraft.

Prince Paul sought to find a counterweight in the Soviet Union, but Stalin was unwilling to push his rivalry with Hitler in the Balkans to the point of jeopardizing the Nazi-Soviet Pact.

 

Before the Axis occupation of Yugoslavia in April 1941 the Germans had developed elaborate schemes for the economic exploitation of Yugoslavia, as for south-eastern Europe generally. In the event, however, they sought merely to maintain their hold over those mines (of copper, chrome, lead, zinc, and bauxite), rich lowland agricultural areas, and lines of rail, road, and river communication which were deemed essential to their war effort.

Even where a facility fell within the zone of occupation of one of their allies, as in the case of the bauxite mines near Mostar, the Germans demanded and got control over the installation and its output.

 

The 'Independent State of Croatia' (Nezavisha Drzava Hrvatska, or NDH) which was set up by the Germans after the their occupation of the country, was also compelled to supply Germany with such of its products as the Germans required, and to pay the costs of the German and Italian occupation forces.

In the rump of Serbia, the value of the minerals and foodstuffs taken by the Germans was simply offset against the huge occupation cost imposed on the Belgrade government. This was not necessarily disadvantageous to peasant farmers in areas of food surplus. They tended to prosper as forcible requisitioning was abandoned in favour of bulk purchases. The residents of cities and towns might also prosper financially, but they were vulnerable to being rounded up for execution in reprisals or deportation to Germany.

Several hundred thousand Yugoslavs were sent to work in the Reich: some as prisoners-of-war (all Serbs), some as volunteers, and some as forcible deportees. The Germans also employed forced labour in some of the mines under their control.

 

The Italians, in contrast, discovered that their share of the Yugoslav spoils was an economic liability, and even had to be fed from Italy.

The Bulgarians and Hungarians concentrated on integrating their portions by expelling post-1918 Serb colonists and imposing their own teachers and administrators. In Macedonia this provoked native resentment, both on account of the high costs to be paid and the absence of the expected opportunities for advancement by the local intelligentsia.

 

 

M.Wheeler,

Oxford Companion to the Second World War (1995), pp.1293,1294